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THE ALIENABILITY OF NON-POSSESSORY
INTERESTS, III*
PERCY BORDWELLt
THE FALL OF SEISIN
The downfall of seisin had little of the drama of the Statute of
Uses.1 In the Preamble of the latter the use had been denounced with
the greatest heat so that it was long a matter of contention that the
execution of the use which the statute had intended was literally such or
in other words, its extirpation. No such legislative denunciation of seisin
marked its passing. It was not a novelty as the use had been but an
antiquity whose mysterious consequences might be disposed of without
passion and almost without remark. Years after the reform legislation
of the first half of the nineteenth century a distinguished judge could
say:
"I am of opinion that there are such things as seisin and disseisin
still."2
Had he said, "I believe in ghosts," the impression created by his words
would have been much the same. Similarly in the United States at the
present time one may say that he believes in the continued existence of
feudal tenure though its ghostlike character can hardly be denied. Had
the reform legislation of 1833 and afterwards abolished seisin and dis-
seisin by name, however, the elimination of their consequences could
hardly have been more thoroughgoing. Maitland went back to that legis-
lation to show that certain conspicuous consequences had survived until
that time.8
In 1833 Reform was in the air.4 The period from 1760 to 1830 is
called by Dicey the period of "Blackstonian optimism" or of "legislative
quiescence," 5 that from 1825 to 1870 the era of "utilitarian reform."0
Bentham, the apostle of utilitarianism, was not himself particularly
versed in, or concerned with, the law of real property but he was pas-
sionately interested in codification of all kinds, and when James Hum-
* This is the conclusion of an article the second installment of which appeared
in (1942) 20 N. C. L. REv. 279. Pressure of events has precluded the completion of
the intervening installments.
t Professor of Law, State University of Iowa.
'St. 27 HEN. VIII c. "10 (1536).2James, L. J. in Leach v. Jay, L. R. 9 Ch. D. 42, 44 (1878).
'Maitland, The Mystery of Seisin (1886) 2 L. QuAR. REv. 481, 483-486.
'For the influence of Bentham, see DIcEY, LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENG-
LAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2 ed. 1917), Lecture VI.5 Id. at 65-6, 62. Id. at 63.
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phreys, a barrister in good standing of Lincoln's Inn, brought- out his
Outlines of a Code of Real Property in 1826 Bentham hastened to his
support.7 Humphreys' opening proposal was that all tenures should be
utterly abolished except copyhold s and his second the appointment of a
commission to do away with copyhold. 9 To himlO* as to Lord Mans-
field,"1* and in the current opinion of the time, 12* seisin was merely one
of the incidents of tenure and would fall with it. Instead of disseisin he
used adverse possession. In the text of his articles -he used the term
owner frequently but never seisin or disseisin. He did not cover the
Law of Personal Property, but thought fewer changes were necessary
there than in the law of Real Property.13
Apparently Humphreys had no anticipation of the interest which his
proposals would arouse and had not thought of them as a project for
immediate legislation.' 4 But the favorable response to them caused him
to get out a second edition a year later with a view to more immediate
legislative action. In this he abandoned the word "code," proposed to
reduce tenures but not to extinguish them, retained the fee tail, omitted
his comparison between Primogeniture and Equal Partibility, as political,
and brought his provisions as to powers more in conformity to the cur-
rent practice in settlements.' 5 In all he proposed 117 articles, two thirds
of which were identical with those in the first edition. The differences in
many of the remaining articles were merely in matters of detail. The
underlying scheme remained the same. Seisin and disseisin had no more
place in the second edition than in the first. Humphreys' proposals had
a profound influence on the New York Revised Statutes of 182916 and
hence on American Law. In England, apparently, his project was re-
sponsible for the appointment of a Royal Commission in 1828. That
Commission was not as radical as Humphreys. To some extent at least
7Bentham on Humphrey's Property. Code (1826) 6 WEsTmINSTR REV. 446.
a p. 180 (1"st ed. 1826). 9 p. 182 (1st ed. 1826).
lO*The chapter on Tenures (id. 9-14) does not mention the various kinds of
tenure or their incidents but deals with livery of seisin, fines, tortious feoffments,
the destructibility and inalienability of contingent remainders.
' 2. In Taylor v. Horde, 1 Burr. 60, 107 (1757), Lord Mansfield says: "Seisin is
a technical term to denote the completion of that investiture, by which the tenant
was admitted into tenure.". He assumes that originally feoffments were made
publicly before the peers of the feudal court and with the lord's concurrence.
2* The identification of seisin with feudal tenure has not been easy to down,
notwithstanding the demonstration by the historical schbol of the last century that
seisin antedated feudalism and applied to chattels as well as to land. It has had,
therefore, to bear the opprobrium of feudalism in a capitalistic age.
13 HUMPHREY, OUTINES OF A CODE OV REAL PROPERTY (1st ed. 1826), p. 7.
1 4 HUMPHREY, OUTLINES OF A C6DE OF REAL PROPERTY (2nd ed. 1827) Preface
p. viii.15 Id. at ix-xi.
" For an acknowledgment of the influence of Humphrey's work see ExTRAcTs
FROM THE ORIGINAL REPORTS OF THE REVIsERs, 3 REVISED STATUTEs OF NEW YORK,
1836, 587.
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it shared the optimism of Blackstone. 17* But the Commissioners appear
to have been singularly free from historical predispositions or dogmatic
bias as to the technique of the law. They were competent and intelligent
workmen, and displayed an expert common sense that reflected the util-
itarian philosophy of the age. .They went about in a business-like way to
clear the law of real property of that which was obsolete and anomalous.
As first constituted, the Royal Commission consisted of one common
lawyer, two equity draftsmen and two conveyancers.18 At the time of
the Second Report three conveyancers had been added of whom Sanders,
because of his death, participated only in the Second Report.- The com-
mon lawyer and head of the Commission was John Campbell, afterwards
Chief Justice and Lord Chancellor. 19 Sugden had been offered the place
but had declined.2 0 Neither Sugden nor Preston, an extreme con-
servative, seems to have participated in the work of the Commission or
to have been in sympathy with it. On the other hand Charles Butler
answered the questionnaire of the Commission at length.2 ' It was to
him that Humphreys had dedicated his second edition.22 The composi-
tion of the Commission assured a due regard for the equity point of
view. As a common lawyer Campbell says that at the time of his ap-
pointment he knew nothing of the land law.23 Where, as in matters of
alienation, equity did not follow the law, there was every likelihood that
the law would be made to follow equity not by providing as in the Judi-
cature Act of 1873 that where equity and law were in conflict, equity
should prevail,2 4 but through the dominance of equitable ideas in the
minds of the Commissioners. The old Elizabethan devotion to the
common law had long ceased. The Commissioners were essentially
equity-minded.
In addition to a general circular asking for communications, the
*The Commission divided the Law of Real Property into the two great divi-
sions of enjoyment and transfer. As to the former, which the Commission evidently
regarded as the Law of Real Property, the introduction went fir beyond Blackstone
and said that it appeared to come almost as near to perfection as could be expected
in any human institution. But the modes by which estates and interests in Real
Propery were-created, transferred and secured seemed to the Commissioners ex-
ceedingly defective. FIRST REPORT MADE TO His MAJESTY BY THE COMMISSIONERS
APPOINTED TO INQUIRE .INTO THE LAw OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY
(1829) 6-7. This gives the key to their recommendations. They thoroughly ap-
proved of primogeniture, the widest power of testamentary disposition and strict
family settlements but as long as these were untouched, they were open-minded as
to the means by which these could be accomplished.
' 12 PROPERTY LAWYER (1829) 33.
191 LIFE OF LORD CAMPBELL (1881) 457-9.
LORD ST. LEONARD'S DEFENCE (1869) 44.
"FIRST REPORT MADE TO His MAJESTY BY THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO
INQUIRE INTO THE LAW OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY (1829) 113-121.
See also APPENDIX TO THE SECOND REPORT 37, 150.
" HUMPHREY, OUTLINES OF A CODE OF REAL PROPERTY (2nd ed. 1827) Preface
pp. v-vi.
"See notes, 19, 20 supra.,36-37 VrcT. c. 66, S. 25, ss. 11 (1873).
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Commissioners got out an elaborate questionnaire on Tenures, Descent,
Dower, Curtesy, Alienation by Deed, Settlement, Fines and Recoveries,
and Limitation of Action and Prescription, addressed to leading barris-
ters and solicitors with a request for answers either in writing or by
',iva oce examinations and to this apparently there was a most generous
response.25 The questions and answers and many of the communications
are printed in the Appendix to the First Report of the Commission and
give a unique picture of the professional opinion of the time as- to what
was obsolete and as to what had long outlived its usefulness. There
was little or no inclination to abolish tenure without at any rate substi-
tuting something in its place although one of the barristers2 6 listed as
inconveniences of tenure, "disseisin, discontinuance, forfeitures and tor-
tious conveyances, that the freehold could not be conveyed without
livery of seisin or in futuro and that contingent remainders might be
destroyed and could not be transferred at law." Commonly these mat-
ters were treated under other heads than that of tenure. The exclusion
of ascendants 7 and of the half-blood28 in the law of descent aroused
real feeling, and that the entry of any person should alter the course of
descent was termed inconvenient and absurd2S*
Under Alienation by Deed, the questionnaire asked if there were any
objection to transfer by deed without livery of seisin or entry or any
equivalent; if it were advisable that any assurances should have the
peculiar effects ascribed to tortious conveyances; if the doctrine of
scintilla juris should be laid to rest; if freeholds in futuro and condi-
tional limitations should be allowed to be created by deeds though not
operating by way of use; and finally if there were any objection to the
transfer of contingent remainders and executory interests by deed.30
Hardly a voice was raised for the retention of livery of seisin or entry
or any equivalent;31 the tortious operation of assurances was almost
universally condemned;32 the scintilla juris was felt by some to be
already dead but in general a legislative declaration of death was felt
desirable;3S there was practical unanimity for allowing the creation of
freeholds in futuro and conditional limitations without resorting to the
Statute of Uses ;34 and there was like agreement for allowing the trans-
fer by deed of contingent remainders and executory devises. 35 No ques-
2' FIRST REPORT (1829) 6.
o W.LIAm CLOWES, FIRST REPORT (1829). 153.
7 See the answers to Question 1, Descent.
' See the answers to Question 7, Descent.
10* Richard Brooke, 198, Ans. 11. John Tyrrell, afterwards a Commissioner;
was of opinion that the elimination of entry "would have the advantage of getting
rid of the rule'of possessio fratris," 311, Ans. 11. Most of the answers to Question
11 were along similar lines.10 See FIRST REPORT (1829) 90, Alienation by Deed, Questions 2, 3, 7-10.
See answers to Question 2.
02 See answers to Question 3. 00 See answers to Question 7.
"See answers to Questions 8 and 9. See answers to Question 10.
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tion was asked as to the desirability of making alienable non-possessory
interests other than contingent remainders and executory interests, such
as conditions and land in the adverse possession of another, but the trend
hs to these is seen in the opposition to tortious conveyances and in gen-
eral to estates by wrong. 6 Conspicuous among the objections to these
were the destruction of contingent remainders8 7 and the forfeiture of
terms for years and life estates,8 8 but there is every indication that the
opposition to the doctrine of estates by wrong 9 was to the doctrine in
its entirety including its effect on the alienability of the dispossessed
owner's right.40 This is borne out by the views expressed by the Com-
missioners 4 1 There was general agreement that there should be some
substitute for Fines and Recoveries.42
Under Limitation of Action and Prescription there was general
agreement that there should be one period for the limitation of actions,
4 3
that the distinction between right of property and right of possession
could be advantageously abandoned, 44 that anyone having title to an
estate in possession should have a right of entry, notwithstanding any
discontinuance, descent cast or othek existing impediments, 48 that the
real actions should be abolished 48 and that one or at most two actions
for the recovery of land should be substituted.4 7 In the questionnaire
disseisin was not mentioned but where one might have expected it
adverse possession was used instead.
The First Report of the Commissioners followed in general the lines
indicated by the answers to their questionnaire. The rules excluding
ascendants 48 .and the half-blood 49 and the rule requiring the entry of the
heir to make him a stock of descent were rejected. 0 Instead, ancestors
were given a preference over collaterals, 51 the full-blood were preferred
to the half-blood but the latter were not excluded,5 2 and it was proposed
that estates should pass to the heirs of the person who last died entitled
although he may not have had seisin."3 In the Inheritance Act of 183354
" See supra, n. 32 and the answers to Question 11, Fines and Recoveries.
:7 See supra, n. 32 and answers to Question 11, subhead 3, Fines and Recoveries.See answers to Question 11, subhead 5, Fines and Recoveries.
See especially answers to Question 11, subhead 1, Fines and Recoveries.
40 See especially the answers of Sanders, 123, Dixon, 186, Bell, 237, Ker, 305,
Tyrrell, 320.
F SrT REPORT (1829) 58.
42 See the answers to Question 1, Fines and Recoveries.
See the answers to Question 2, Limitation of Action and Prescription.
"See the answers to Question 3, Limitation of Action and Prescription.
"See the answers to Question 4, Limitation of Action and Prescription.
"See the answers to Question 5, Limitation of Action and Prescription.
'¢ See the answers to Question 6, Limitation of Action and Prescription.
:'FIRsT REPORT (.1829) 10, 12, 63 (Propositions 1-5).
" Id. at 11, 12-13, 63 (Propositions 7-9).
"Id. at 15-16, 64 (Proposition 13). " See supra, n. 48.:2 See supra, n. 49. " See supra, n. 50.
a' ST. 3 & 4 WILLIAM IV c. 106 (1833).
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the proposals as to ascendants 5  and the half-blood 56 were adopted but
instead of tracing descent from the one last entitled it was provided that
descent should be traced from the purchaser.57 This was more favorable
to the half-blood than the proposal of the Commissioners. That proposal
went even further than the possessio fratris in deflecting the descent
from its original course whereas the statute restored that course and
utterly eliminated any suggestion of the possessio fratris.58 The shift
from the one last entitled to the first purchaser as the source of title was
a return to the earlier law as expounded by Blackstone.59 The influence
of Blackstone and the dislike for the possessio fratris probably had much
to do with the shift. The proposal of the Commissioners had eliminated
the importance of what they considered the accident of entry but had
exaggerated what was apparently considered the more substantial evil,
the change in the course of the descent. The canon that descent should
be traced from the purchaser remained with slight modification 0 the law
in England until January 1, 1926 when under the Administration of
Estates Act, 1925,61 all the old canons of descent as to the fee simple
were abolished 62 and new rules established applicable alike to realty and
personalty.63 That Act provides that all the real estate to which a
deceased person was entitled shall pass,64 as recommended by the
Commissioners almost a century before.
Seisin in law had been sufficient to support dower at common law65
but seisin in fact had been necessary to entitle the husband to curtesy.66
The Commissioners recommended that dower be given out of lands to
which the husband had a right but to which he had neither seisin in law
nor in fact6 7 and that a like rule be adopted for curtesy.68 The recom-
mendation as to dower was adopted in The Dower Act, 1833,69 but no
like act as to curtesy was passed, so that in July 1896 Charles Sweet
could say that the reform legislation had deprived seisin of its theoretical
as well as its practical importance in all cases except two, the one where
land bad been conveyed by feoffment which could not operate as any
other mode of assurance and the other where a man claimed an estate
by the curtesy.70 The anomaly as to curtesy was greatly cut down by
" INHERITANCE ACT OF 1833, s. 6.
INHERITANCE ACT OF 1833, s. 9. 57 INHERITANCE ACT OF 1833, s. 2.
' See the comment of Joshua Williams, WATKINS, THE LAw OF DESCENTS (4th
ed. 1837) 284.
8' See supra, p. 286.
00 See LORD ST. LEONARD's ACT, 1859, 22, 23 VICT. c. 35, ss. 19, 20.
0115 Gao. V c. 23 (1925).
I21d. s. 45. 'Id. s. 46.
8 4 ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES ACT, 1925, s. 1(1).
05 FIRST REPORT (1829) 16.
I00 d. at 19.
" Id. at 18, 69 (Proposition 1). 8'Id. at 19, 70 (Propositions 1 & 2).
00ST. 3 & 4 Wm. IV c. 105, s. 3 (1833).
Sweet, Seisin (1896) 12 L. QUAR. REv. 239, 244.
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the abolition of curtesy as to the fee simple by the Administration of
Estates Act, 1925,71 but curtesy as to the fee tail is still a possibility.72
However as the fee tail is now exclusively equitable, 73 and the require-
ment of an actual seisin for curtesy did not apparently extend to equitable
estates, 74 the continued possibility of curtesy in an entail does not ap-
parently keep alive the distinction between seisin in law and seisin in
deed. Equitable seisin of some kind may still be required but the case
will be a rare one, for most entails are in remainder and on that account
not subject to curtesy.7 5
Fines and recoveries were one phase of the old land law that was still
in full vigor at the time of the reform legislation. These assurances still
performed a useful function in the transfer of the property of a married
woman and in the docking of entails76 but their validity depended upon
seisin of freehold77* which had come to be very capricious, 78 they were
very expensive79 and because of their extraordinary operation extremely
dangerous except in the hands of the most skilled conveyancers.80 The
mischiefs arising from the necessity bf the freehold being in the tenant
to the praecipe in the case of the recovery occupy more than a page of
the Commissioner's First Report.8 ' Accordingly in the substitute for
the recovery which the Commissioners recommended,8 2 they abandoned
the principle that the life tenant would have to be a party to the docking
of an entail by a remainderman but substituted for him a 'protector of
the settlement' 83 who would normally be but did not have to be, the life
tenant.8 4 Moreover to dock the entail, either seisin or title was to be
sufficient.8 5 The substitute proposed for both the fine and the recovery
was an enrolled deed88 which like other deeds would operate innocently.
These recommendations of the Commissioners were embodied in the
Fines' and Recoveries Act of 1833.87*
"115 GEO. V c. 23, s. 45 (1925).
72 Ibid.
71LAW OF PROPERTY AcT 1925, s. 1 (1), (3).
'FIRST REPORT (1829) 19; LEWIN ON TRUSTS (13th ed. 1928) 744; Parker v.
Carter, 4 Hare, 400, 418 (1844).
"That this was the rule'as to dower at common law notwithstanding that seisin
in law was sufficient to support it, see 1 ScRmNER ON DOWER (2 ed. 1883) 321.
" See FIRST REPORT (1829) 31.
"* In the case of the fine, this requirement was embodied in the plea partes
finis nikil habierunt tempore finis levati, in the case of the recovery in the necessity
of the freehold being in the tenant to the praecipe.
See FIsr REPORT (1829) 24-25, 26-27 and suspra, p. 285.
"The Commissioners mention one case in which 4000 pounds Sterling had been
paid for a fine, FiRsT REPORT (1829) 25. "FIRST REPORT (1829) 21.
sI FIRST REPORT (1829) 24-25. 8 FIRs T REPORT (1829) 32-33.
83 This phrase was not the Commissioners' own but embodied their ideas. It
appeared in the FINES AND RECOVERIES Acr, 1833, c. 74, s. 22.
8 FIRST REPORT (1829) 32-33, 71-72 (Propositions 3-5).
"Id. at 71 (Proposition 3). 8o Id. at 31, 72 (Proposition 8).
"* ST. 3 & 4 Wm. IV c. 74 (1833). By s. 15 any "actual tenant in tail" was
empowered to dock the entail and under s. 1 a tenant was to be deemed an actual
tenant although the estate tail may have been divested or turned to a right. See 1
[Vol. 21
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In dealing with the limitation of actions the Commissioners had their
work pretty much laid out for them. The old real actions had long been
superseded in general practice by ejectment. However admirable they
had been in the thirteenth century in building up the common law, they
were highly formal, stereotyped and ill-suited to the changes in the law
wrought -by uses and the Statutes of Uses and Wills. Had not ejectment
taken their place, probably some other action would have.8 8 But they
still lay in the background and though discouraged, apparently were
sometimes brought.8 9 In a few instances there was no period of limita-
tion.9 0 As to most real actions the period was either sixty, or fifty or
thirty years 91 although the period for writs of formedon had been re-
duced to 20 years, by the same statute, 21 Jac. I c. 16 (1623), that had
limited for the first time rights of entry92 and thus indirectly the action
of ejectment. That statute had also fixed 20 years as the period for
rights of entry. Obviously this diversity was not conducive to the quiet-
ing of title.9 3* There was general agreement that the real actions should
go and that a uniform period of limitation should be established. A few
thought two forms of action should be substituted in their place9 4 but
ejectment had the field and was recommended by the Commissioners as
the only form of action for the recovery of land except in two special
cases.95 The natural complement to this was one period of limitation.
Had the reform stopped with ejectment and a single period of limita-
tion there would have been, without more, a substitution of the posses-
sion on which ejectment was based for the seisin on which the old writs
were based, a substitution of dispossession or discontinuance of posses-
sion for the old disseisin, abatement, intrusion and deforcement and a
substitution of the recovery of possession for the recovery of seisin.9 6
These changes were reflected in the language of the Commissioners. This
change in language alone was almost certain to relieve the law of much
that was technical in the old law of seisin and disseisin, but the Com-
missioners did not leave this to chance. They recommended that wher-
HAYES ON CONVEYANCING (5th ed. 1840) 155. That the substituted assurance
would not operate as a tortious conveyance, see id. at 193." SED;wicx & WAIT, TRIAl OF TIn To LAND (2nd ed. 1886) 3 HALEfs Com-
MON LAW (4 ed. 1792) 176; Finlasonrs notes to 4 REmvas' HisTORY oF ENGZIsH LAW
(1880) 235, 238, 242.
FIRST REPORT (1829) 42. 90 Id. at 40.9 Id. at 39; see 32 HEN. VIII c. 2 (1540).
02 FIRST REPORT (1829) 39.
"* The same criticism could not be made of the process by fine with proclama-
tions under ST. 4 HEN. VII c. 24 (1488), under which rights might be barred if
claim were not made within five years but here the Commissioners felt that the law
went too far in the opposite direction. FIRsT REPORT (1829) 43.
" See supra, p. 288.
05 Dower and Quare Impedit. FIRST REPORT (1829) 41, 77 (Proposition 1)..T These implications of ejectment had been stressed by Lord Mansfield in Tay.
lor v. Horde, 1 Burr. 60, 111-114 (1757).
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ever one was entitled to the possession he should have a right of peace-
able entry and that no claim to lands and that no entry on land should be
of any avail to the person making the same, unless he obtain actual
possession of such lands. 97 This was to eliminate the old doctrines of
descent cast and continual claim, and in the act that followed these were
abolished by name.98 The Commissioners were apparently unwilling to
give such perpetuation to the old learning as would be involved in using
the old terminology for its abrogation. These changes made the right of
peaceable entry and the right of action co-existent 99 so that, while these
remained as distinct remedies to the one entitled, they ceased to represent
successive stages in the deterioration of title as they had under the older
system. Henceforth there were to be no such successive stages, no dis-
continuance by which a right of entry would be turned into a right of
action or as some preferred to call it a right of possession into a right
of property. These distinctions were accidents of the old system and
the profession was glad to get rid of them. Right of entry might still
be used to indicate the right of one entitled to land in the adverse posses-
sion of another, but more as a quaint .survival than as anything else.
Right of entry and disseisin were complementary, and the new proposals
left disseisin in no better place than discontinuance. Dispossession had
taken its place and dispossession, while broad enough to include the old
disseisin at election as well as the old disseisin, was not the mere sum of
those two things but something new, and not to be circumscribed by the
distinctions of the old system. In interpreting the Limitation Act of
1833 the judges of a later time seem hardly to have been conscious of
them.
0 0
One might have thought that adverse possession would have fared
better in the later English law than disseisin, for it is used in the proposi-
tions of the Commissioners while disseisin is not. If it had, the statute
would have run from the commencement of the adverse possession, as is
generally true in the United States, and not from the time the action
accrued; but the decisions did not take that course.1 1 In one case, that
of the tenant at will, the Statute had provided for the running of the
statute of limitations-although there was clearly no adverse posses-
sion.102 Perhaps in general adverse possession smacked too much of
the old disseisin. The two were treated as identical by counsel' 0 3 in a
7
FIsT REPORT (1829) 41-42, 77 (Propositions 3, 4).
98 ST. 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 27, ss. 10, 11, 39 (1833).
"Wherever there is a right of action there should be a right of entry, and
wherever there is a right of entry there should be a right of action." FIRST REPORT
(1829) 41.
100 See LIGHTWOOD, PossEssIoN OF LAND (1894) 63, Sweet, Scisin (1896) 12
L. QuAR. REv. 239, 249."'1 See LIGTwooD, THE TImE LIMIT OF AcTioNs (1909) 6.
10' 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 27, s. 7 (1833).
10' Sir W. W. Follett in Nepean v. Doe, 2 M. & W. 894, 900 (1837).
[Vol. 21
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case soon after the Statute of 1833 in which was argued that the statutes
of limitation contained no reference to adverse possession which had
been engrafted by the courts upon the statute 21 Jac. I. c. 16. The court
went even further than this, and held that the second and third sec-
tions of the new act had done away with the doctrine of non-adverse
possession.' 0 4 Accordingly, adverse possession has no such place in
England as in the United States. Instead of looking under Adverse
Possession, one looks there under Limitation of Actions.
The effect of the old disseisin has been minimized by the assumption
that the entry of the younger brother, or other more remote heir, was
not adverse to the older brother' 0 5 and by the requirement of proof of
actual ouster in the case of tenants in common, joint tenants and
coparceners. 1° 6 The Commissioners deemed neither rule desirable, 0 7
and their recommendations' 0 8 were embodied in the Statute.10 9 Another
recommendation hit at the forfeitures which had characterized tortious
conveyances. The proposal was made" that if a person held under an
assurance purporting to pass a larger estate than it did rightfully pass, the
time would not commence to run until the rightful interest should have
terminated. The Statute, however, did not mention the tortious con-
veyance, but did make a like provision for the running of the statute
where there had been a breach of condition.
111
One of the advantages that the Commissioners felt would accrue from
the abolition of the real actions was "in rendering useless the vast mass
of technical learning connected with them.""12 One of these matters
was warranty."13 Another, apparently, was remitter. Remitter had once
been a matter of considerable importance. Littleton had devoted a chap-
ter to it.114 Where one with an older right had come to a defeasible
estate other than by his own act or his own assent he was remitted to
his older right, thus defeating the possessory action which could have
availed against him as to the defeasible estate. 1 5 This was a doctrine
springing from the hierarchy of real actions and clearly out of place in
the new scheme of things. Accordingly, when Challiss suggested it in
"Id. at 911.
'15 FsrST REPORT (1829) 47. 200 Id. at 48.
207 Id. at 47-48. ... Id. at 79 (Propositions 20, 21).
105 ST. 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 27, ss. 12, 13 (1833).
11 0 
FIRST REPORT (1829) 79 (Proposition 19).
111 ST. 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 27, s. 4 (1833).
1 5FIRST REPORT (1829) 42.
That a right to enter should not be defeated by warranty see id. at 39; ST. 3
& 4 Wm. IV, c. 27, s. 39 (1833). Under Fines and Recoveries, the Commissioners
had also recommended that estates tail should not be barred by warranty (FIRST
REPORT (1829) 31, 71, Proposition 2) and this recommendation was adopted (ST. 3
& 4 Wm. IV, c. 74, s. 14 (1833).11,Lmm' mroN TmrnUazs, bk. III, c. 12.
5 BuTLER, NoTE 1 to Co. LIT. 347 b.
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1889116 Charles Sweet, referring to the Limitation Act, replied that "the
statute was passed for the express purpose of getting rid of the doctrines
of seisin, disseisin and remitter."117
The diversity in the periods of limitation under the older law left
little chance for any theory that the right was barred as well as the
remedy. The shorter periods could have had no such effect and although
a different effect might conceivably have beei given to the limitation of
the Writs of Right, any such difference in result would have been re-
markable. To have picked out the provisions applicable to the Writs of
Right and to have given them the effect of a prescriptive bar, whereas
the like provisions as to other actions were treated as peculiar to those
particular forms of action and therefore distinctly procedural would have
been something that apparently did not occur to anyone." 8 This was
not because the notion of a bar of the right was not familiar. It was
familiar as the consequence of the lapse of a year and a day after the
obtaining of seisin under a judgment in a Writ of Right' 19 in pursuance
to the levying of a fine.' 20 But there was nothing to suggest anything of
this in the statutes of limitation, nor did the judges take it upon them-
selves to read it into the statutes. By a Statute of Edward 111121 the bar
of the fine was abolished and this lasted for over a hundred years.' 2 2
The maxim gained currency that a right could not die.' 23 This was
probably of ecclesiastical origin 24 but doubtless it confirmed the reme-
dial character of the statutes of limitation. With the establishment of a
uniform period of limitation, however, the situation was quite different.
The quieting of titles was present in the minds of the Commissioners as
much as the cutting off of stale claims. They rejected the suggestion
that possession for a certain period regardless of disabilities or future
interests should give an absolute title after the manner of the civil
law,125 for they thought that the one entitled to a future interest should
have his time from the accrual of his action. However, they cut down
the time to which the ordinary period of twenty years might be extended
by disabilities to a flat forty years 126 and they made the running of the
statute a bar to the right.' 2 7 Furthermore, the commissioners proposed
"' The Squatter's Case (1889) 5 L. QuAR. REv. 185, 186; CHALLIss, REAL
PROPERTY (3 ed. 1911) App. iii.1 1 7Seisin (1896) 12 L. QuAR. REv. 239, 249; see also Sweet's note to CHALLIS S,
RL PROPERTY (3 ed. 1911) 435.
118 See 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2nd ed. 1923)
141. 122 id. at 76.1202 id. at 101. 111 ST. 34 EDW. III, c. 16 (1360).... ST. 1 Ric. III, c. 7 (1483). This statute was superseded by ST. 4 HEN. VII,
c. 24 (1847). 123 LIT. TENURES, s. 478.
"2 See MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (3rd Am. ed. 1887) 276.
.2 FIRST REPORT (1829) 45-46.
1.. Id. at 45, 78 (Proposition 6). This recommendation was embodied in ST. 3
& 4 Wm. IV, c. 27, s. 17 (1833)."" Id. at 81 (Proposition 37) followed in 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 27, s. 34 (1833).
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that the right should be vested in the party in possession 128 thus giving
color to the theory that the Statute should operate as a Parliamentary
conveyance. However, nothing was said to that effect in the Statute,
and the theory has not prevailed.129 Instead, the English theory is one
that looks in the first place to the destruction of the old right, and only
incidentally to the creation of the new, as compared with the modem
American doctrine of adverse possession where the creation of the new
right is primary and the destruction of the old right secondary. The one
is a doctrine of negative, the other of positive prescription. Both are a
far cry from the old disseisin.
In their Second Report, in 1830, the Commissioners made their most
radical recommendation, the adoption of a General Register of Deeds.
For a good many years persistent efforts were made to get Parliament
to adopt this reform but without success.'8 0 Finally in 1853 favor
turned towards a Register of Title.'31
The Third Report of the Commissioners in 1832 was a continuation
of the First Report plus the additional topics of Perpetuities, Covenants
and A Period of Limitation for the Rights of the Church. In line with
the general sentiment expressed in the First Report, 8 2 the Commis-
sioners now proposed that all future and contingent estates and interests
be made assignable and devisable but then seemed to detract from this
by providing that tis should not authorize the transfer of an estate or
interest under a limitation to the heirs of a living person during the life
of that person. 133 This proviso savored at least of the distinction be-
tween uncertainty as to event and uncertainty as to person. The proposal
was incorporated by reference in the Fourth Report dealing with Wills
but with the omission of the proviso and with the recommendation that
the privilege of alienability be extended to rights of entry and of action
and suit.' 3 4 As so-modified the proposal was embodied in Section 3 of
the Wills Act of 1837 except that any distinction turning on uncertainty
as to person was expressly repudiated.' 3 5 In the mention of rights of
entry and action in the Fourth Report there was a retrocession from the
more modern terminology of the First Report and a return to that of
'- FIRsT REPORT (1829) 81 (Proposition 37).
12 See LIGHTWOOD, POSSESSION OF LAND (1894) 273 and the opinion of Cozens-
Hardy, M. R. Inr re Atkinson and Horsell's Contract, 2 Ch. 1 (1912).
1O See REPORT OF THE REGISTRATION AND CONV1EYANCING COMMISSION (1850)
Appendix VI, 239-41; REPORT OF THE REGISTRAT1ON OF TITLE CoMMIssION
(1857) 3.
1I See REPORT OF THE REGISTRATION OF TITLE COMMIssION (1857) App. F for
the REPORT OF THE SELECT CoMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS (1853). This
led to the REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF 1857. The latter definitely turned the
tide in favor of Registration of Title in England.
'FIRST REPORT (1829) 57 and see supra, p. 287.
THIRD REPORT (1832) 26-27, 28, 69 (Proposition 7).
FOURTH REPORT (1833) 23, 80 (Proposition 8).7 Wm. IV, & 1 VICT. c. 26, s. 3 (1837).
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the old law, although incident to the abrogation of the latter. In the
Wills Act right of entry only was mentioned.
Eight years later like transfers by deed were authorized and again
right of entry was mentioned though not right of action.18 6 In their
First Report the Commissioners had shown a consciousness of the con-
flict between such alienability and the prevailing laws against champerty
and maintenance and had recommended the repeal of the latter.13 7 Not-
withstanding this, section 2 of ST. 32 HEN. VIII c. 9 (1540) against the
buying of pretended titles was not repealed until 1897.138
Another recommendation of the First Report had been that all estates
should be transferable by a single deed without the forms of livery of
seisin or entry. The lease and release was to become obsolete.180 By a
statute of 1841, the necessity of a prior lease was avoided and the con-
veyance was to take effect as if it had been by lease and release1 40 but
four years later the grant was preferred to the release and it was de-
clared that henceforth corporeal hereditaments should lie in grant.141
To this extent the rule long applicable to incorporeal hereditaments was
applied but whereas the latter lay in grant but not in livery, the Statute
expressly allowed transfer by livery as well in the case of corporeal
hereditaments and it was not until the Law of Property Act, 1925, that
the rule hitherto applicable in the case of incorporeal hereditaments was
applied in full to corporeal hereditaments. In that Act it was declared
that "all lands and all interests therein lie in grant and are incapable of
being conveyed by livery, or livery and seisin, or by feoffment or by
bargain and sale."142 Had the feoffment been abolished with the fine
and the recovery, there would thereby have been an end to the convey-
ances capable of a tortious operation, but as the feoffment lingered on,
there was need of express legislation if its tortious operation were to be
avoided and this is found in the Acts of 1844143 and 1845.144
The Third Report furthermore struck at the very roots of contingent
remainders.145 The Report said that it was not clear on .what principle
contingent remainders had been first established. The latter were hard
to reconcile with the present operation of the feoffment and the general
rule against transfers of the freehold in futuro. They were much more
like the executory interests arising under the Statutes of Uses and Wills
1368 and 9 Vlcr. c. 106, s. 6 (1845). A statute of the previous year, 7 & 8 VicT.
c. 76, s. 5 (1844) had made contingent and executory interests and rights of entry
for condition broken transferable.
1 7 Fmsr REPORT (1829) 58.
... ST. 60 & 61 Vicr. c. 65, s. 11 (1897).
Fisr REPORT (1829) 57.
", ST. 4 & 5 VIcr. c. 21, s. 1 (1841).1 ST. 8 & 9 Vicr. c. 106, s. 2 (1845).
ST. 15 GEO. V, c. 20, s. 51 (1925).
ST. 7 & 8 Vicr. c. 76, s. 7 (1844).
14, ST. 8 & 9 Vicr. c. 106, s. 4 (1845). "'THmD REPORT (1832) 23-25.
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than like the vested remainder. But unlike these executory interests they
were subject to destruction. This the Commissioners characterized as
subversive of intent. Accordingly, they proposed that in the case of the
destruction or determination of the particular estate before the happen-
ing of the contingency, the contingent remainder should be deemed a
future estate and not a remainder. 14 6 An act of 1844 carried out the
logic although it went beyond the express proposal of the Commissioners
by abolishing contingent remainders altogether and converting them into
executory interests. This was evidently too radical for the profession
and in slightly less than a year the contingent remainder was restored as
though the previous act had not been passed.148 The new Act made no
provision for the preservation of the contingent remainder where the
contingency had not happened until after the natural determination of
the life estate, but did provide against its destruction by the premature
destruction of the life estate.14 A hard case in 1876160 is supposed to
be responsible for the Act in the following year that in substance adopted
the proposal of the Commissioners. 151
Under Covenants the Commissioners showed the same favor for
their running with the land that they had shown for the transferability
of non-possessory interests. To make the running of the covenants turn.
on whether they touched or concerned the land, on the existence of the
subject matter at the time of the covenant, on the use of the word
assigns,152* or on privity of estate 5s* seemed to the Commissioners to
introduce unneeded technicalities into a matter where intent alone should
be the guide and where intent might well be presumed in favor of the
running. Subsquent legislation in England has made the existence of
the subject matter immaterial' 54 and the word assigns unnecessary.155
It has also cut down the requirement of privity of estate.' 56 But what is
in effect the requirement that the covenant shall touch and concern the
land is still retained. 157
The Fourth Report of the Commissioners, in 1833, was concerned
140 Id. at 68 (Proposition 1). "1 ST. 7 & 8 Vicr. c. 76, s. 8 (1844).
ST. 8 & 9 Vicr. c. 106, s. 1 (1845). 1 ' Id. s. 8.
1 0 Cunliffe v." Brancher, 3 Ch. D. 393 (1876).
ST. 40 & 41 ViCr. c. 33 (1877).
1'* These three requirements are referred to in TnID REPORT (1832) 45 and
rejected as artificial apparently not only with regard to leases but also where no
landlord and tenant relationship exists (id. at 46).
'"* That the benefit of covenants should run regardless of privity of estate see
id. at 52 and that the burden should not run at law where no landlord and tenant
relationship exists even though there be privity of estate see id. at 53.
1515 Gao. V, c. 20, s. 79_(1) (1925).155Id. s. 80 (3).
50 ST. 44 & 45 Vicr. c. 41, ss. 10, 11 (1881) ; 15 GEo. V c. 20, ss. 141, 142
(1925) ; See also Bordwell, English Property Reform and Its American Aspects
(1927) 37 YALEn L. J. 1, 19-21.
15 Bordwell, English Property Reform and Its American Aspects (1927) 37
YALE L. J. 1, 19-21.
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with Wills and resulted in the Wills Act of 1837.158 The provision of
that Act making nonpossessory interests devisable has already been
mentioned. 159 But the Report and the Act went much further than this
in the departure from the old law. The old devise had affected only land
which the devisor had at the time of making the will. This was a natural
interpretation of the language of the Statutes of Wills6 ° and was at-
tributed by Coke to that language.' 0 ' However, this was denied by
Jarman' 62 on the ground that the same thing was true of land devisable
by custom. In either case the devise was treated as a conveyance and it
was fundamental that a man could not convey that which he did not
have. That the devise was treated as a conveyance would seem to have
been the outcome of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical
Courts over wills. As a conveyance the devise was specific and without
the ambulatory character of the true will. The Commissioners recom-
mended that a will might pass after-acquired land, and, that as to the
property comprised in it, it should speak as of the testator's death unless
a contrary intent were shown.163 These recommendations were carried
out in substance in the Act.1
64
A curious omission in the work of the Commissioners was their
failure to set the question of the scintilla juris at rest. According to this
doctrine there was a scintilla of right left in the feoffee to uses notwith-
standing the Statute of Uses that would enable them to enter and de-
stroy springing and shifting uses. In the questionnaire sent out by the
Commissioners, the question had been asked as to whether this matter
should not be set to rest.165 The answers had been overwhelmingly in the
affirmative. But for some reason nothing appears to have come of this
in the Reports and the repudiation of the doctrine was left for an Act
of 1860.166
And so the reign of seisin came to an end. Uses had threatened it
from the first. These had been anathematized in the Preamble of the
Statute of Uses,167 but the Statute itself had belied the Preamble by
giving the stamp of seisin to the use. For a time in the reign of Elizabeth
seisin seemed to have regained its old power.168 The common law was
for the time being in the ascendance and accomplished the destruction of
the contingent remainder and the preference for common law interests.
7 Wm. IV and 1 VIcT. c. 26 (1837).See supra, p. 295.
16032 HEN. VIII, c..1 (1540) ; 34 & 35 HEN. VIII, c. 5 (1542).
... Butler and Baker's Case, 3 Co. 25a, 30b (1591); Leonard Lovie's Case, 10
Co. 78a, 83b (1613), cited in FOURTH REPORT (1833) 24.
1021 JARMAN ON WILLS (6th ed. 1910) 66. Jarman was perhaps influenced by
the opinion of Lord Mansfield in Harwood v. Goodright, Cowper, 87, 90 (1774),
cited in FOURTH REPORT (1833) 24.
... FOURTH REPORT (1833) 24, 80 (Proposition 9).
17 WM. IV & 1 VIcT. c. 26, ss. 3, 24 (1837).
'"FIRsT REPORT (1829) 90, Alienation by Deed, Question 7.
1.. ST. 23 & 24 Vicr. c. 38, s. 7. 1 627 HEN. VIII, c. 10 (1536).
. Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. 120a (1594).
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But its return to power was short-lived. With the Restoration, Equity
became the Mayor of the Palace and with all its punctiliousness towards
seisin and the common law yet ruled in fact if not in name. With the
reform legislation seisin was definitely deposed. Like tenure, however,
it was deposed but not abolished.
So ingrown a word as seisin, or even disseisin, was not easy to up-
root. As late as 1896 Charles Sweet could say: "So recently as 1877,
the late Mr. Joshua Williams delivered a course of practical lectures to
students in conveyancing under the title of 'The Seisin of the Freehold.'
All living writers on real property also treat seisin as a fundamental part
of it."169 Mr. Williams had chosen that subject to illustrate the growth
of the English law of Real Property. 7 0 One suspects that it had been
chosen because of its prominence in connection with the rule that a con-
tingent remainder must vest during the continuance or at the determina-
tion of the supporting freehold,' 7 ' a rule which Mr. Williams thought
both "absurd and injurious"'172 and which was abolished before his lec-
tures were published.' 73 He was not enamoured of seisin and was thor-
oughly in sympathy with the legislation that had stripped it one by one
of its important consequences. He used the language of seisin and
disseisin and right of entry, however, in his hypothetical case of the
squatter,174 and this was quoted by James, L. J. in Leach v. Jay47 5 in
the opinion in which he stated it was his belief that there were such
things as seisin and disseisin still.176 In that case a testatrix had used
the word "seised" and was held to its technical meaning in the old law
notwithstanding the great unlikelihood that such could have been her
meaning.'7 7 One doubts whether such a decision would be reached today
in England. It would have hard going in the United States.
To the obsoleteness of seisin, Sir Frederick Pollock at one time took
vigorous exception.' 78  His apparent acquiescence however, in what
Charles Sweet then said to prove such obsoleteness,' 79 shows that he
was using seisin in an unaccustomed sense. He could not mean that the
law about seisin and its consequences of Bracton's time was still law.
Much less could he mean that the artificial disseisin and discontinuance
... Sweet, Seisin (1896) 12 L. QuAR. Ray. 239.
"" WILLIAMS; THE SEIsi OF THE FREEHOLD (1878) 1.
171 Id. at 200, 201.
171 Id. at 202. This was not the only rule in connection with which seisin of free-
hold was used but it would seem to have been the rule that was uppermost in Mr.
William's mind.
173 See id. at 200 n(a), 201 n(c), 202 n(d), 205 App. B.
'17 Id. at 7-8.
173L. R. 9 Ch. D. 42, 44 (1878). 276 See supra, p. 284.
x" In the court below, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 496, 499 (1877), Jessel, M. R. had said that
he had made his decision reluctantly. See also Charles Sweet, Seisin, (1896) 12
L. QUAR. REv. 239, 247.
"8 In his discourse on The Vocation of the Common Law delivered at the
Commemoration Meeting of the Harvard Law School Association, June 25, 1895
and printed in (1895) II L. QUAR. REv. 323, 329.
S'' Sweet, Seishn (1896) 12 L. QuAR. REv. 239 n. 2.
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and descent cast and continual claim of a later time was still law. Even
less by seisin did he mean the fictitious seisin that had come in by the
Statute of Uses and that meant little more than legal as distinguished
from equitable title.180 He probably had little sympathy with Ames'
views' s ' as to the nontransferability of mere rights.182* By seisin, he
meant the primacy of possession in the law of property.' 8  Two years
before he had said, "The leading idea of Germanic property law is not
ownership, but possession and rights to possess."'1 4 Then he had also
said, "We have refined in various ways on the right to possess-making it
for certain purposes, by benignant fictions, equivalent to possession itself
until there remains about it little or no practical difference from owner-
ship as conceived by a Romanized philosophy of law."' 85 Still he did not
believe they would "ultimately coincide.' 8  But if the right to possess
in the common law had become practically equivalent to the ownership
of the Roman law then possession had lost its primacy and seisin in this
primary sense had become a matter of history. As a matter of fact it is
doubtful whether even as history Sir Frederick Pollock's theory was
sound.18s7* In the older law seisin in fee as of right was the highest
interest one could have in land and of these seisin had the spotlight
but that the right that was back of what were called the proprietary writs
was conceived of as a mere right to possession would seem to be a pure
assumption. Proprietary right only gradually came into its own but
right of property and property seem to have been akin to ownership
from the first. At least as early as 1477 Brian, C. J. denied that
property in a chattel was dependent on a right to possession.188
Seisin, disseisin and right of entry as quaint phrases in the law will
probably still linger on. Equity of redemption still lingers although the
right of the owner be no equity but ownership itself. But the system of
which they were an integral part has long ceased to function and they
should be relegated to their place in that system.
"'See Charles Sweet, Seisin (1896) 12 L. QUAR. Ray. 239, 247 n. 4, quoting
ELPHINSTONE AND CLARK, GOODEVE ON REAL PRoPERTY (3rd ed. 1891) 365.
... Ames, Disseisin of Chattels (1889) 3 HARv. L. REv. 23-40, 313-328, 337-346, 3
Sel. es. 541-590.
... * In his PoLLoc, CONtRAcTS (10th ed. 1936). 213 he explains the non-assign-
ability of contracts at common law "as a logical consequence of the archaic view of
a contract as creating a strictly personal obligation between the creditor and the
debtor."
I" Pollock, The Vocation of the Common Law (1895) 11 L. QoARP. REv. 323,
329-331.""' Pollock, Archaism in Modern Law (1893) 9 L. QuAR. REv. 271, 283.
2
85 Id. at 284. 18 Id. at 284.
lS,* Late in life Sir Frederick was less dogmatic. In a letter to Mr. Justice
Holmes of July 12, 1926 he said that a learned Frenchman-apparently Joilon des
Longrais-appeared to maintain that the Germanic seisin or gewere was a real
dominium quite contrary to what he himself had always collected from the English
sources. 2 HoLmEs-PomocK LErxas (1941) 186. In his letter of reply Mr. Justice
Holmes made no comment on this. Id. at 187.'" Y. B. 17 EDW. IV, 2A, transl. BLACKBURN, SALE (3 Can. ed. 1910) 286.
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